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Abstract
It is well known that deep learning models are vulnera-
ble to adversarial examples crafted by maliciously adding
perturbations to original inputs. There are two types of at-
tacks: targeted attack and non-targeted attack, and most
researchers often pay more attention to the targeted adver-
sarial examples. However, targeted attack has a low success
rate, especially when aiming at a robust model or under a
black-box attack protocol. In this case, non-targeted attack
is the last chance to disable AI systems. Thus, in this pa-
per, we propose a new attack mechanism which performs
the non-targeted attack when the targeted attack fails. Be-
sides, we aim to generate a single adversarial sample for
different deployed models of the same task, e.g. image clas-
sification models. Hence, for this practical application, we
focus on attacking ensemble models by dividing them into
two groups: easy-to-attack and robust models. We alter-
nately attack these two groups of models in the non-targeted
or targeted manner. We name it a bagging and stacking en-
semble (BAST) attack. The BAST attack can generate an ad-
versarial sample that fails multiple models simultaneously.
Some of the models classify the adversarial sample as a tar-
get label, and other models which are not attacked success-
fully may give wrong labels at least. The experimental re-
sults show that the proposed BAST attack outperforms the
state-of-the-art attack methods on the new defined criterion
that considers both targeted and non-targeted attack per-
formance.
1. Introduction
Recent research has shown that machine learning mod-
els can easily be fooled by adversarial samples which
are crafted by adding designed perturbations to the in-
puts [5, 17]. From the perspective of attack goals, there are
two types of adversarial attacks: (1) the non-targeted attack,
which crafts adversarial examples misclassified as wrong
labels; (2) the targeted attack, which generates adversarial
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Figure 1. Adversarial examples generated for Inc-v3 [16], AdvInc-
v3 [18] and ResnextDenoiseAll [20] under the white-box protocol.
Left column: the original images. Middle column: the adversar-
ial noises. Right column: adversarial images. Top row: ensem-
ble in loss method [3]. Bottom row: our method. Both adver-
sarial images are classified by Inc-v3 and AdvInc-v3 as the target
label “cup”. While the adversarial image in top row can’t fool
ResnextDenoiseAll, the adversarial image in bottom row gener-
ated by our method successfully fools ResnextDenoiseAll, classi-
fied by ResnextDenoiseAll as “Ibizan hound”.
examples classified as target labels. People are more inter-
ested in the targeted attack. However, the targeted attack
has a lower success rate.
In a black-box attack protocol, it is probable to utilize
the transferability of crafted adversarial examples which
can be misclassified by unseen target models [11, 9, 12].
While existing approaches are effective to generate non-
targeted transferable adversarial examples, targeted adver-
sarial examples are hardly transferred [9]. Even in a white-
box attack protocol, the targeted attack also has little ef-
fect on some adversarial robust models. As shown in Fig.1,
targeted attacks on three models are conducted in the top
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row, with an ensemble attack method in [3]. Inc-v3 [16]
and AdvInc-v3 [18] miss-classify the adversarial image as
the target label “cup”, while the adversarial robust model
ResnextDenoiseAll [20] still successfully classify it as the
true label, which means the adversarial robust model is hard
to be targetedly attacked, even for the white-box attack.
In this paper, we propose a new adversarial attack mech-
anism, which maximizes the attack success rate by consid-
ering both the targeted and non-targeted attacks but prior-
itizing targeted attack. When the targeted attack fails, this
adversarial sample hopefully performs the non-targeted at-
tack successfully. Besides, as shown in the bottom row of
Fig.1, the generated single adversarial example is able to
fool all deployed models and even for ResNextDenoiseAll,
the non-targeted attack at least succeed. Thus in our attack,
different models are firstly divided into two groups, easy-
to-attack models and robust models. Two groups of models
are then alternately attacked. We name this attack a bagging
and stacking ensemble (BAST) attack. Our contributions
are as follows:
1. We present a new adversarial attack mechanism, at-
least-non-targeted attack. To test the efficiency of methods
in this attack protocol, we design a new evaluation criterion.
2. We propose a novel ensemble attack method, BAST
attack, to make sure at-least-non-targeted attack succeed.
BAST attack outperforms the state-of-the-art attack meth-
ods with respect to at-least-non-targeted attack.
3. Experimental results on image classification mod-
els demonstrate that adversarial examples crafted by our
proposed method are able to fool multiple models in ei-
ther white-box or black-box protocol, achieving an optimal
trade-off between non-targeted attack and targeted attack.
2. Backgrounds
In this section, we review the backgrounds of adver-
sarial attack and defense methods. Following Sharma et
al. [14], we conduct attack based on MIFGSM [3], utiliz-
ing some methods in sec. 2.1, including input diversity [21]
and a translation-invariant method [4], to improve the trans-
ferability. The defense models to evaluate our proposed
method include pretrained models on ImageNet [13] and
some robust models trained with some defense methods in
sec. 2.2.
2.1. Attack Methods
2.1.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [17] performs a single
step update on the original sample x along the direction of
the gradient of a loss function J(x; y; θ), where J is often
the cross-entropy loss. In the scenario where perturbation
 is to meet the Linf norm bound ‖ x∗ − x ‖∞< , the
adversarial example is computed as
x∗ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, y)) (1)
2.1.2 Momentum-based Iterative Method
To solve the problem that most adversarial attacks fool
black-box models with low success rate, Dong et al. pro-
pose a momentum-based iterative algorithm, MI-FGSM [3].
By integrating momentum term into the iterative process of
attack, this method can craft more transferable adversarial
examples by computing as
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ(x
∗
t , y)
‖∇xJ(x∗t , y)‖1
(2)
x∗t+1 = x
∗
t + α · sign(gt+1) (3)
2.1.3 Input Diversity Method
Xie et al. propose that diverse inputs can improve trans-
ferability of adversarial examples [21]. Based on the MI-
FGSM [3], random transformation is performed on the in-
put during each iteration to realize the input diversity. Their
experiments show that the combination of random scaling
and random zero padding has the best performance.
2.1.4 Translation-invariant Method
Dong et al. propose a translation-invariant attack method to
generate more transferable adversarial examples against de-
fense models [4]. To improve the efficiency, the translation
operation is realized by convolving the gradient of the un-
translated image with a predefined kernel function W . The
update rule to compute adversarial examples is as follow-
ing:
x∗ = x+ α · sign(W ∗ ∇xJ(x, y)) (4)
2.1.5 Ensemble Method
Ensemble methods have been widely adopted in previ-
ous researches to enhance the performance of neural net-
works [6, 2, 7]. For example, Bagging [1] and Stack-
ing [19], can both improve accuracy and robustness of neu-
ral networks. Recently, Liu et al. propose novel ensemble-
based approaches to generate adversarial examples, which
improve the transferability even for targeted adversarial ex-
amples [9].
2.2. Defense Methods
Adversarial training [17, 5] is the simplest and most
widely used method to defense adversarial attack. It can in-
crease robustness by directly adding a considerable amount
of adversarial examples generated by different attack meth-
ods to the training set during network training. Madry et
Algorithm 1 Attack on single model
Input: A classifier f with loss function J ; a real example x and
ground-truth label y; The size of perturbation ; iterations T
and decay factor µ; The random preprocess function div();
gaussian kernel W.
Output: An adversarial example x∗ with ‖x∗ − x‖∞ ≤ .
1: α = /T ; g0 = 0; x∗0 = x;
2: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
3: Do random preprocess for input to obtain div(x∗t );
4: Input processed image div(x∗t ) to f and obtain the gradi-
ent∇xJ(div(x∗t ), y);
5: Convolve the gradient with W to get smoothed gradient
W ∗ ∇xJ(div(x∗t ), y);
6: Update gt+1 by accumulating the velocity vector in the
gradient direction as
gt+1 = µ · gt + W ∗ ∇xJ(div(x
∗
t ), y)
std(W ∗ ∇xJ(div(x∗t ), y))
; (5)
7: Update x∗t+1 by applying the clipped gradient as
x∗t+1 = x
∗
t + α · clip[−2,2](round(gt+1)); (6)
8: end for
9: return x∗ = x∗T .
al. [10] regard adversarial training as a framework of max-
imum and minimum game and train more robust models in
this way.
Xie et al. propose a denoising network architecture [20],
which enhances adversarial robustness by adding feature
denoising module. Combined with adversarial training, fea-
ture denoising networks greatly improve the adversarial ro-
bustness, especially in targeted attack protocol. However,
non-targeted attack is still a threat to these defense meth-
ods.
3. The Proposed Method
To generate adversarial examples in at-least-non-
targeted protocol, we propose a novel ensemble attack
method, BAST attack. In this section, we first give a brief
introduction of previous ensemble methods and explain
their drawbacks in at-least-non-targeted attack protocol. We
then introduce the attack method for a single model, which
is the base for our ensemble attack. Finally, we present our
solution, BAST attack, which enables us to efficiently craft
adversarial examples in at-least-non-targeted attack proto-
col.
3.1. Previous Ensemble Methods
In NIPS 2017 adversarial attack competition [8], Dong
et al. [3] report three different ensemble methods including
ensemble in logits, ensemble in predictions and ensemble
in loss, the only difference of which is where to combine
the outputs of multiple models. All methods simply add
model’s outputs together and then average. We focus on
ensemble in loss and give its formulation as follows:
Origin class boundary of easy-to-attack models
Target class boundary of easy-to-attack models
Origin class boundary of robust models
Target class boundary of robust models
Targeted  ensemble attack
BAST attack
Figure 2. Illustration of targeted ensemble attack versus BAST at-
tack.
…
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…
Figure 3. One iteration of BAST attack. It has two main steps: (1)
From It to Itemp, attacks are performed on easy-to-attack models.
(2)From Itemp to It+1, attacks are performed on robust models.
J(x, y) =
∑N
i=1 wiJi(x, y) (7)
where Ji(x, y) is the cross-entropy loss of the i-th model.
The loss function J(x, y) is optimized by gradient-based
algorithms such as FGSM. When the targeted attack is per-
formed on the ensemble, the gradient always points to target
class boundary of easy-to-attack models rather than that of
robust models, shown as the green arrow in Fig. 2. To fully
utilize the the gradient information of robust models, we
propose our method, BAST attack.
3.2. Attack on Single Model
To achieve high success rate and strong transferability
of adversarial examples, we follow Sharma et al. [14] to
use Algorithm 1 as our baseline attack for a single model.
For targeted attack, ground-truth label y is exchanged with
target class label y∗ and the plus sign in Eq.(6) is changed
to the minus sign. To further improve the transferability in
black-box attack scenario, cropping is added into the ran-
dom preprocess [21].
3.3. BAST Attack
Motivated by ensemble methods such as Bagging [1]
and Stacking [19], we propose a novel ensemble method
for adversarial attack, called bagging and stacking ensem-
ble (BAST) attack, as shown in Algorithm 2.
In our BAST attack, all models are divided into two
groups: easy to attack and robust models. The models in
each group compose an ensemble model in a way similar
to Bagging. The same type of attack, non-targeted or tar-
geted attack, is performed on each ensemble. The Bagging
ensemble model obtains a lower variance by averaging pre-
dictions of independent models. In another aspect, differ-
ent groups compose an ensemble model in a way similar to
Stacking. In Stacking, outputs returned by some lower layer
weak learners are used to train a meta model, while in our
BAST attack, outputs of last Bagging ensemble model are
fed into the next one.
Fig. 3 shows one iteration of BAST attack. In practical
application, we conduct targeted attack on easy-to-attack
models for m times and conduct non-targeted attack on
other models for n times, respectively. By controlling these
two hyperparameters, the performance of BAST attack can
be further improved.
4. Experiments
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to val-
idate the effectiveness of the proposed method. We first
specify the experimental settings in Sec. 4.1. Then we de-
scribe a new evaluation criterion in at-least-non-targeted at-
tack protocol in Sec. 4.2. We further evaluate our proposed
method utilizing different adversarial models in Sec. 4.3 and
Sec. 4.4.
4.1. Setup
We conduct experiments on ImageNet [13]. The max-
imum perturbation  is set to 16, with pixel values in [0,
255]. We ensemble three models, which are a normally
trained model—Inception v3 (Inc-v3) [16], an adversar-
ially trained model—AdvInception v3 (AdvInc-v3) [18]
and an extremely robust model trained by Facebook—
ResnextDenoiseAll (AdvDeRex) [20], as the substitute
model to be attacked. For BAST attack, we set Inc-v3
and AdvInc-v3 as easy-to-attack models, AdvDeRex as the
robust model. Besides white-box attack success rates of
the three models, we also report black-box attack success
rates evaluated on a normally trained model—Inception
v1 (Inc-v1) [15] and an adversarially trained model—
AdvInceptionResnet v2 (AdvIncres-v2) [18]. We evaluate
with 1000 images from ImageNet [13] which are specially
Algorithm 2 BAST attack
Input: The logits of classifiers l1, l2, ..., lN+M ; ensemble
weights w1, w2, ..., wN+M ; non-targeted attack times n and
targeted attack times m; a real example x and ground-truth
label yture, target label ytarget; the size of perturbation ; it-
erations T and decay factor µ; the random preprocess function
div(); gaussian kernel W.
Output: An adversarial example x∗ with ‖x∗ − x‖∞ ≤ .
1: α = /T ; g0 = 0; x∗0 = x;
2: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
3: x∗t+1 = x
∗
t
4: for i = 0 to 1 do
5: if i=0 then
6: k0 = 1, K = N , y = ytrue, s = n;
7: else
8: k0 = N + 1, K = N +M , y = ytarget, s = m;
9: end if
10: for j = 0 to s− 1 do
11: x∗t = div(x
∗
t+1)
12: Input x∗t and output lk(x∗t ) for k = k0, k0 +
1, ...,K;
13: Get softmax cross-entropy loss Jk(x∗t , y) based on
Jk(x
∗
t , y) = −1y · log(softmax(lk(x∗t )));
14: Total loss J(x∗t , y) =
∑K
k=k0
wkJk(x
∗
t , y);
15: Obtain the gradient∇xJ(x∗t , y);
16: Update gt+1 by Eq. (5);
17: Update x∗t+1 by Eq. (6);
18: end for
19: end for
20: end for
21: return x∗ = x∗T .
chosen to be classified by our models correctly. For tra-
ditional ensemble attack methods, the number of iterations
is 100, which is enough to make the algorithm converge.
For BAST attack, as we conduct targeted attack on easy-to-
attack models form times and then conduct non-targeted at-
tack on robust models for n times, the number of iterations
is set as [200/(m+ n)] for comparison. We set m = 2 and
n = 1.
4.2. Evaluation Criteria
Notice that we aim to obtain a weighted combination of
targeted and non-targeted attack. Thus a new evaluation cri-
terion is needed to verify the efficiency of tested methods.
The evaluation score is defined as the following formula:
F =
1
n
n∑
i=1
F (xi) (8)
and
F (xi) =
 1, if targeted attack succeeds0.5, if only nontargeted attack succeeds
0, if attack fails
(9)
Method Inc-v3 AdvInc-v3 AdvDeRex Inc-v1 * AdvIncres-v2 *
Bagging attack 0.0/100.0/100.0 0.0/99.8/99.8 18.3/4.0/13.15 32.7/6.2/22.55 23.7/7.5/19.35
Stacking attack 0.0/99.5/99.5 3.0/91.2/92.7 4.9/0.1/2.55 11.3/0.9/6.55 14.0/0.5/7.5
BAST attack 0.0/100.0/100.0 0.7/98.2/98.55 72.0/0.1/36.1 40.5/6.7/26.95 29.7/8.5/23.35
Table 1. Results on ImageNet, shown as A/B/C(%), where A represents that non-targeted attack succeeds but targeted attack fails, B
represents targeted attack succeeds and C is the score computed by Eq.(8). The sign * represents attack on this model is black-box attack.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
trombone tailed frog scorpion golf ball Tibetan terrier brass Norwich terrier tree frog
guinea pig scooter brambling quilt hornbillredbonenautilus analog clock
Figure 4. Adversarial examples and perturbations generated by BAST attack, Bagging attack and Stacking attack. (a): Natural examples
and their target class labels. (b): BAST attack. The predicted labels by AdvDeRex are in the yellow patch. (c): Bagging attack. (d):
Stacking attack. All adversarial images are classified by Inc-v3 and AdvInc-v3 as the target labels, while only adversarial images in (b)
successfully fool AdvDeRex.
where n is the number of images for evaluation and F is the
attack score on one model. For each image xi, if targeted
attack is successful on a model, F (xi) is 1 point on this
model. If targeted attack is not successful, but non-targeted
attack is successful, then F (xi) is 0.5 point. Otherwise,
F (xi) is 0 point.
Method Inc-v3 AdvInc-v3 AdvDeRex Inc-v1 * AdvIncres-v2 *
Without-stacking 0.0/100.0/100.0 0.0/99.9/99.9 62.5/0.1/31.35 41.3/3.7/24.35 32.0/5.0/21.0
Without-bagging 0.0/99.1/99.1 2.8/93.5/94.9 69.7/0.1/34.95 39.3/5.0/24.65 27.7/5.3/19.15
BAST 0.0/100.0/100.0 0.7/98.2/98.55 72.0/0.1/36.1 40.5/6.7/26.95 29.7/8.5/23.35
Table 2. Results for different ensemble methods, shown as A/B/C. A represents that non-targeted attack succeeds but targeted attack fails,
B represents targeted attack succeeds and C is the score computed by Eq.(8). The sign * represents attack on this model is black-box attack.
Hyperparameters Inc-v3 AdvInc-v3 AdvDeRex Inc-v1 * AdvIncres-v2 *
(a) m=1, n=1 0.0/99.6/99.6 2.8/92.2/93.6 77.7/0.1/38.95 41.6/3.7/24.5 30.8/5.4/20.8
(b) m=2, n=1 0.0/100.0/100.0 0.7/98.2/98.55 72.0/0.1/36.1 40.5/6.7/26.95 29.7/8.5/23.35
(c) m=3, n=1 0.0/100.0/100.0 0.3/98.9/99.05 67.3/0.1/33.75 39.8/7.5/27.4 27.1/9.9/23.45
(d) m=5, n=5 0.0/99.8/99.8 3.0/92.0/93.5 74.4/0.1/37.3 38.8/4.0/23.4 28.6/4.2/18.5
(e) m=10, n=10 0.0/99.9/99.9 3.4/91.6/93.3 71.6/0.1/35.9 37.5/4.2/22.95 27.0/4.6/18.1
Table 3. Results for different combinations of m and n in BAST attack, shown as A/B/C. A represents that non-targeted attack succeeds
but targeted attack fails, B represents targeted attack succeeds and C is the score computed by Eq.(8). The sign * represents attack on this
model is black-box attack.
4.3. Main Results
We evaluate three methods: (1) Bagging attack. The tar-
geted attack is performed on all three models in the bagging
way, which means the ensemble method is Eq.(7), where
the ensemble weight wi for each model is the same. (2)
Stacking attack. The targeted attack is performed on each
model alternately in the stacking way. (3) Our BAST attack.
Our main results are in Table 1. We show that:
(1) Our new attack mechanism, at-least-non-targeted at-
tack, plays a key role in attacking multiple models, espe-
cially when attacking some robust models.
Focus on the column “AdvDeRex” in Table 1. When
we conduct targeted ensemble attack, the highest targeted
attack success rate on AdvDeRex is 4.0%. The low suc-
cess rates indicate that targeted adversarial examples have a
low attack success rate especially on robust models. Thus
a successful non-targeted attack on these robust models is
essential.
(2) Our BAST attack outperforms other methods in the
at-least-non-targeted attack protocol.
BAST attack gets competitive results with other two tar-
geted ensemble attacks on easy-to-attack models. On the
robust model, however, BAST attack largely improve the
non-targeted attack success rate with little decrease in tar-
geted attack success rate. We list some natural images in
ImageNet and corresponding adversarial images and per-
turbations crafted by BAST attack in Fig. 4. Moreover, in
black-box attack on ImageNet, BAST attack outperforms
targeted ensemble attacks on the success rate of both non-
targeted and targeted attack, indicating that our BAST at-
tack improves the transferability of crafted adversarial ex-
amples.
4.4. Analysis of BAST Attack
In this section we study factors which affect the perfor-
mance of BAST attack.
We first focus on the ensemble method. Our BAST
attack is intuited from bagging and stacking. It is natu-
ral to compare it with two special ensemble methods: (1)
Without-stacking, which ensembles all models only in the
bagging way. Pay attention to the difference of Without-
stacking with Bagging attack in Table 1: Without-stacking
is a variant of BAST, also set in at-least-non-targeted pro-
tocol, which means the attack on the robust models is al-
ways non-targeted. (2) Without-bagging, which ensembles
all models only in the stacking way.
Results are in Table 2. According to the evaluation score,
BAST outperforms other two methods in both white-box
and black-box protocol. One intriguing phenomenon is that
the non-targeted attack success rates of three methods on
AdvDeRex are far higher than 15.6% of non-targeted bag-
ging attack, indicating that performing non-targeted attack
on the bagging ensemble weakens the effect of robust mod-
els.
We then study the effect of hyperparameters. In one iter-
ation of BAST attack, we conduct targeted attack on easy-
to-attack models form times and then conduct non-targeted
attack on robust models for n times. Experiments are con-
ducted on different combinations of m and n, and results
are shown in Table 3. We conclude as follows:
(1) Comparing (a) with (b) and (c), the targeted attack
success rate of AdvInc-v3 increases with more targeted at-
tack iterations, while the non-targeted attack success rate
of AdvDeRex decreases. Thus the trade-off between non-
targeted and targeted attack success rate can be adjusted
flexibly in this way.
(2) Comparing (a) with (d) and (e), on the condition n =
m, the performance becomes poor as the value of n and m
increases. n and m with large value limit the diversity of
ensemble.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have stated a new adversarial attack
mechanism, at-least-non-targeted attack, which is more im-
portant for practical application. In order to achieve this,
a novel ensemble attack method, BAST attack has been
proposed. Extensive experiments have shown the effective-
ness of the BAST attack which has improved non-targeted
attack success rate while keeping targeted attack perfor-
mance. That means it outperforms the state-of-the-art en-
semble attacks.
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